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gain of a son-in-law, and Antigonus, the husband of Paulina. But she, too, obtains her reward in a new husband, one whom we may suppose to be more congenial to her nature than Antigonus. Camillo, at the request of the King, is united to her; the male and the female mediatorial characters of the play belong together.

If we now bring before the mind the various elements of the drama, we observe that there is first portrayed the civilized State in which a diremption takes place, being produced by the guilt of its king. This guilt causes a flight to a primitive condition, to a pastoral world, which in its turn develops contradictions which bring about its dissolution. But the monarch repents of his guilt which called forth the diremption; he undoes his deed without, and reconstructs his character within. Hence there results a third part, whose theme is the restoration of the separated members, and the resulting unity and harmony of the two previous contradictory spheres. Guilt produces the division, repentance produces the reconciliation. Repentance is therefore the pivotal principle of the entire drama, but it has not generally received that prominence from critics which its importance requires.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Rosenkranz's Summary of Logic.

[The following brief summary of Logic is translated from Karl Rosenkranz's *Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee*, p. 194 et sqq. It will prove suggestive to those who seek a genetic order in the sequence of the parts of Logic. Upon reflection, one will see that these parts are so arranged that the abstract or simplest comes first, and is followed by a part which seems to be the very thing to correct the deficiency of the first, and this by a third which combines the two former synthetically. From the beginning on to the last there is a struggle for fit and adequate *expression* of truth in its universal and necessary form; and when this is not exhaustive, the subsequent forms try to make it so. For a more expanded treatment of this, the reader is referred to *Hegel's First Principle*, vol. iii. of the *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, and, for a genial and less abstract exposition, to C. C. Everett's *Science of Thought*, Boston, 1869.—EDITOR.]

The Notion is the unity of the Universal, the Particular, and the Individual—*A* is *a*, *b*, *c*. Each of these moments may be referred to the other—Judgment. The moment that is determined is the Subject; that which

determines, the Predicate. The Determination has or has not existence in the Subject. The Inherence or Non-inherence is fortuitous: Affirmative Judgment—*a* is *b*; or Negative Judgment—*a* is not *b*. The Inherence or Non-inherence of a determination—*a* is not *b*, Limitative Judgment. Not generally, therefore, is *a*, *b*; but only this *a* is *b*, Singular Judgment. But not only this *a*, but also this, and this, and this, &c.; i.e. some or many *a*'s are *b*: Particular Judgment. Hence all those *a*'s, in so far as, taken individually, they can be summed, are *b*: Universal Judgment. Not merely through the common possession of some determination, but as being identical in their essence, all *a*'s are necessarily *b*: Categorical Judgment. If, then, *a* is, *b* must be; because *a* cannot exist without being *b*—Hypothetical Judgment. The Distinction of the Universal from itself is the Particular—*a* is either *b* or *c*: Disjunctive Judgment. In its immediate actuality the subject has some determination—*a* is *b*: Assertive Judgment. Whether this determination is one corresponding to its essence, or (only) a possible one, depends upon the actuality of the notion of the essence—if *a* is, then *b* is: *c* may be *a*; then *c* will also be *b*; but whether *c* be *a* is a question—Problematical Judgment. If the Reality corresponds to the Notion, then *a*, as *c*, is *b*—Apodeictic Judgment. The Subject corresponds to its Notion because its Reality is so determined. The Actuality, as so determined, cannot be otherwise: it is necessary. All subjects, so determined, are, in this point, necessarily identical—*a* is *b*; *c* is *a*; therefore *c* is *b*. Because the Individual is a Particular it is a Universal. By this mediation of one moment of the Notion through the others, the Judgment becomes the Syllogism. The Individual, as such, is the sum of manifold determinations, which may relate themselves variously. Such determinations, therefore, occupy the position of particulars, and these particulars, in themselves, belong to a circle which includes them in it as its universality. *a* is *b*; *c* is *a*; therefore *c* is *b*. *a* exists actually in *c*: the conclusion is affirmative. But it might as well be true that *a* did not exist in *c*, although its actuality in it were possible; then *c* would exclude *a* from it, and the conclusion would be negative: *a* is *b*; *c* is not *a*; therefore *c* is not *b*. The determination, as being a mere inherence, is consequently only a fortuitously actual one, and the conclusion therefore must limit itself to the singularity of the subject. All *a*'s are *b*; this *c* is *a*; therefore *c* is *b*. But the actuality of inherence is evidently possible not merely for *c*, but also for other subjects; *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, *h*, *i*, *k*, &c., are also *b*; if these many *a*'s, viz. *d*—*k*, be *b*, then all other *a*'s, viz. *l*, *m*, *n*, *o*, &c., will also be *b*—the Inductive Conclusion. If *a* is *b*, and *c* is *a*, then *c* is *b*. The determinateness of a subject includes the same, through its identity with that of another in other predicates besides this one—the Analogical Conclusion. The true basis, however, of the identity of all individual subjects in the totality of their predicates is the unity of their essence. The individuals, then, coincide, because they must coincide. The relativity of the coincidence of more or fewer subjects in more or fewer points is eliminated in the absoluteness of the identical Notion, whose necessity is the universal necessity of all the subjects in its sphere; or, as we may also say, the inherence of the subsumption raises itself to the immanence of the organic division of the Notion into Universality, Parti-

cularity, and Individuality, as the distinction of genus, species, and individual. All individuals of a kind or genus are in their essence identical; all *a*'s are essentially *b*; *c* is *a*; therefore *c* is *b*—Categorical Inference. If, therefore, all *a*'s are essentially *b*, and *c* is *a*, then *c* must be *b*—Hypothetical Inference. The universal notion distinguishes itself in its particularity. *A* is *a*, *b*; *c* is *A*; therefore it is either *a* or *b*—Disjunctive Inference. The inherence-inference is assertive, because it is fortuitous that this determinateness belongs just to this subject. The subsumption-inference is problematical, because this individual subject may be an exception from the rest; because, besides these subjects, even though they be many and may pass as all, there are others possible; finally, because, from the existence of this predicate in two subjects, it does not follow that a predicate which is found with the one, must therefore necessarily exist with the other. The immanence-inference is apodeictic; for the essence of the genus is that of the species, and that of the species that of the individuals. The individual is what it is only as its species, and the species is what it is only as its genus. The connection of the individual, through the particular, with the universal is one that cannot be severed; for the universal posits itself, through the particular, in the individual, or, more correctly speaking, as the individual. The disjunctive judgment is the developed Notion, and the disjunctive inference is the inference of the all-sided mediation of necessity, in which the Reality compares itself with its Notion, and the extension is therefore bounded by the content itself. The Notion presents to us, at first, the yet ideal, simple unity of its moments. These divide up, first in fortuitous determinations, then in different numbers, and finally in the necessity of their essential connection. From these different relations they return, through the mediation of the individual moments, back to the unity of the Notion.

Translated by THOMAS DAVIDSON.

Professor Vera on Strauss.

Professor Vera writes from Naples that the second edition of his French Translation of Hegel's Logic (vol. i. of the "Encyclopædia") has lately been published in Paris. It appears in two volumes, and is very much enlarged by the addition of notes and reviews of recent systems hostile to the Hegelian. His translation of the Philosophy of Religion, which has been promised so long, is now actually going through the press in Paris. We anticipate a very favorable reception of this treatment of the work wherein Hegel has expounded with great clearness the ideas of the various religions, and especially those of Christianity. An English translation would make an epoch in Theology.

Professor Vera animadverts on the communication of Professor Davidson in the July number regarding his volume on *Strauss et l'ancienne et la nouvelle foi*. In reply to the first point, "He who knows only one philosophy knows none," he says: "What should we think of a man who would come forward and say, 'Plato, Aristotle, Schelling, and Hegel, did not know a jot about philosophy, because they considered their philosophy as the only true philosophy?'" It belongs to the philosopher to regard his